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ECONOMISTS are  accustomed  to analyzing  the effects  of aggregate  levels  of 
activity  on prices.  In the past two years,  they have had the unaccustomed 
task of analyzing  the effects  of price changes  on the aggregate  level of 
activity.  The problems  started  in early  1973  with  the food price  runup,  the 
switch  to Phase III of the controls  program,  and the devaluation  of the 
dollar, and accelerated  with the quadrupling  of world petroleum  prices 
since  the summer  of 1973.  Primarily  as a result  of these  events,  aggregate- 
demand  management  has had to contend  with an explosion  of prices  that 
has  been  unprecedented  for  at least  a generation  in size  and  persistence  and, 
more unusual,  in redistributive  effects  on purchasing  power. 
Inflation  in the postwar  United States  has not generally  involved  sub- 
stantial  losses of real  income  by wage  earners.  In the aggregate,  the excess 
of wage  increases  over  price  increases  has been  fairly  constant,  resulting  in 
a correspondingly  steady  improvement  in average  real wages. However, 
during  1973  and 1974,  real  average  hourly  earnings  in the private  nonfarm 
sector fell by 5 percent.  This decline  compares  with a rise of about the 
same  amount  that  would  have  been  predicted  from  the average  of postwar 
experience.  Part  of the decline  represented  a redistribution  of income  to the 
farm sector of the economy.  Other  parts  corresponded  to the worsening 
terms  of trade  resulting  from  devaluation  and to a widening  of profit  mar- 
gins in the domestic  business  sector  that  followed  the end of Phase  II con- 
Note: I am grateful  to Jan Broekhuis  for research  assistance. 
222 George  L. Perry  223 
trols.1  And a large  part,  particularly  during  1974,  was due to a redistribu- 
tion of income  to foreign  and domestic  oil producers. 
Such  redistributions  affect  aggregate  demand  if the gainers  and losers 
have different  propensities  to spend on U.S. goods and services.  For a 
variety  of reasons,  developments  before the surge in oil prices did not 
clearly  call  for a deliberate  restoration  of the consumer  purchasing  power 
that  had  been  lost to inflation:  Some  capacity  had  to be diverted  to expand- 
ing the nation's  trade  surplus.  The farm  sector  was expected  to enlarge  its 
capital  outlays  as well as consumption  spending,  and much of the 1973 
shift of income  in its favor was expected  to reverse  itself. Some price  in- 
creases  during  Phase  III reflected  the restoration  of normal  relations  be- 
tween  wages  and prices.  And finally,  unemployment  was below 5 percent 
and declining  gradually  until  late in the year.  On balance,  it was hard  to 
make  a case  for an expansionary  shift  in aggregate-demand  policy during 
most of 1973. 
The  situation  changed  drastically  once  the rise  in world  oil prices  began. 
In the fourth  quarter  of 1973,  unemployment  started  rising  and real final 
sales dropped.  Most important,  by the end of 1974, the increase  in oil 
prices  had added  an estimated  $37  billion  to the annual  cost of petroleum 
products  used  in the  United  States.2  A rise  this  big  could  not have  been  pro- 
jected  from  the price  increases  already  in place  as of the first  of the year; 
but  even  that  early,  a rise  of $20  billion  could  have  been  foreseen.3  In addi- 
tion  to destroying  consumer  purchasing  power,  by the  end of the year  these 
price  increases  had a further  impact  on aggregate  demand  by adding  an 
estimated  2.6 percent  to the demand  for money.4 
Noticeable  offsets  to these  depressing  effects  of high oil prices  could  not 
have  been  expected  on balance.  Exports  to oil producers  could  rise  by only 
a small  fraction  of the higher  import  bill, especially  in the short  run.  The 
expected  rise in real investment  in the domestic  oil and coal industries 
would  be limited  by material  and manpower  shortages  and fully  balanced 
1. The prospect  of this widening  was discussed  by Robert  J. Gordon,  "The  Response 
of Wages  and Prices  to the First Two Years of Controls,"  BPEA (3:1973), pp. 765-78. 
2. George  L. Perry,  "The Petroleum  Crisis  and the U.S. Economy,"  paper  prepared 
for the Conference  on the Impact  of Higher  Oil Prices  on the World  Economy  (Brook- 
ings Institution,  November  1974; processed). 
3. Walter  W. Heller  and George L. Perry,  "The U.S. Economic Outlook for 1974" 
(National  City Bank of Minneapolis,  January  8, 1974; processed). 
4. This estimate  assumes  that money demand  has a price elasticity  of 1.0 on a price 
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by cutbacks  in the  expansion  plans  of utilities  that  were  already  apparent  at 
the first of the year. Meanwhile,  automobile  production  was slumping 
badly  and, in the face of sharply  higher  gasoline  prices,  was likely  to re- 
main  even  weaker  than  the decline  in real  income  would  account  for. 
Policy  Responses 
Neither fiscal nor monetary  policies offset the depressing  impact of 
higher  oil prices  during  1974. Spending  in fiscal  year 1974 ended up $7 
billion  below  the original  budget  estimate,  and  the full employment  surplus 
was  allowed  to rise  steadily  from  $7.7  billion  in the third  quarter  of 1973  to 
$30.4  billion  four  quarters  later.5  After  declining  in the first  two months  of 
the  year,  interest  rates  rose  very  rapidly  into  midsummer.  The  federal  funds 
rate  rebounded  from  a low of 8.8 percent  in early  March  to a brief  peak  of 
13.5  percent  four  months  later.  Commercial  paper  rates  rose  from  73/4  per- 
cent  to nearly  12  percent  over  a similar  period  and  averaged  11.5  percent  in 
the third  quarter.  The money  supply  never  grew  fast enough  to keep pace 
with  inflation  and  almost  completely  leveled  off  during  the  summer  months. 
Using  the public  version  of the SSRC-MIT-Penn  (SMP)  model,  table 1 
presents  estimates  of the difference  some alternative  policies  would have 
made  in economic  performance  since  the oil crisis.  Several  remarks  are in 
order  concerning  these estimates.  First, no attempt  was made to benefit 
from  perfect  hindsight  to find  an optimal  policy.  Indeed,  with  the economy 
experiencing  inflation  alongside  falling  real  output,  it would  be hard  to get 
agreement  on the target  for an optimal  policy.  The  policy  alternatives  tried 
here  are  those corresponding  roughly  to the kinds of proposals  that were 
made  during  1974  by outside  observers.  Second,  the estimates  are  based  on 
a particular  model  and  reflect  its particular  characteristics.  Compared  with 
my own  view  of the world,  the model  gives  somewhat  weaker  responses  to 
fiscal  policy  and stronger  responses  to the money supply.  However,  for a 
combined  policy containing  fiscal and monetary  actions working  in the 
same  direction,  its overall  GNP response  appears  reasonable.  Third,  the 
5. Economic  Report  of the  President  together  with  the Annual  Report  of the Council  of 
Economic  Advisers,  February  1975,  p. 64. Part of this rise was clearly  inadvertent.  As the 
Report  indicates,  full employment  receipts  in the third quarter  of 1974  would have been 
$5 billion  to $7 billion lower without the extraordinary  inventory  valuation  adjustment 
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model  erred  substantially  in tracking  actual  developments  in 1974,  just as 
we human  forecasters  did. Accordingly,  after  presenting  results  from the 
model, I offer some conjectures  on how these errors  might have been 
smaller  under  alternative  policies, and how the model's projections  of 
alternative  policies  might  be amended. 
For monetary  policy, three  alternatives  are modeled:  (1) a constant  6 
percent  rate  of money  growth  starting  in the fourth  quarter  of 1973,  right 
after  the oil embargo;  (2) money  growth  of 6 percent  plus the percentage 
required  by increases  in oil prices  each quarter;6  and (3) a constant  7 per- 
cent interest  rate on commercial  paper,  achieved  by allowing  the rate to 
continue  the decline  that started  early  in 1974  until  it reaches  7 percent  at 
the end of the first  quarter  of that year. 
For fiscal  policy,  the only alternative  modeled  is a $20  billion  reduction 
in personal  taxes  starting  in the  first  quarter  of 1974.  Since,  unlike  monetary 
policy, fiscal  measures  cannot realistically  be adapted  quarterly  to eco- 
nomic  changes,  this alternative  represents  a compromise  in several  direc- 
tions.  It is a smaller  tax cut than  the ultimate  loss in purchasing  power  due 
to oil prices,  but  about  large  enough  to offset  the loss projected  at the start 
of the  year.  It also  assumes  more  rapid  passage  of tax-cut  legislation  than  is 
reasonable.  But  taken  as a proxy  for changing  the full employment  surplus 
in the budget,  it is not unrealistically  fast. Part  of the rise  that occurred  in 
the surplus  could  have  been  headed  off at almost  any time by avoiding  the 
curtailment  of scheduled  expenditure  programs. 
MONETARY POLICIES 
The monetarist  policy of steady  6 percent  growth  in the money supply 
(first  bank, table 1) produces  an estimated  path for the economy only 
slightly  different  from that actually  followed.  Actual money growth  was 
faster  than  6 percent  in the first  three  quarters  of the projection  period,  and 
slower  thereafter.7  Real GNP is slightly  lower  with  the 6 percent  rule  in all 
6. The addition  to money demand  is assumed  equal to the rise in final sales directly 
attributable  to the increase  in oil prices  ($37 billion by the last half of 1974)  taken as a 
percent  of GNP. Estimates  of the increases  in final  sales resulting  from  oil-price  increases 
are from  Perry,  "Petroleum  Crisis." 
7. In the SMP model, a quarter's  money supply  is defined  as its level at the end of a 
quarter.  For example,  for the fourth quarter,  the estimate is made by averaging  the 
December  and January  levels. This dating gives somewhat  different  quarterly  averages 
and changes  from other  datings  that are commonly  used. 226  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1975 
Table  1. Increments  in Selected  Economic  Indicators  from  Alternative 
Economic  Policies,  Quarterly,  1973:4-1975:1 
Com- 
Gross  national  mercial  Unem- 
product  Private  paper  ployment 
nonfarm  rate  rate 
Current  1958  business  (per-  Money  (per- 
dollars  dollars  deflator  centage  supply  centage 
Policy and  quarter  (billions) (percent) (percent)  points)  (percent)  points) 
6 percent  growth  in 
money  supply 
1973:4  -0.8  -0.1  0.0  0.4  -0.4  0.0 
1974:1  -2.1  -0.2  0.0  0.8  -0.7  0.0 
2  -4.2  -0.3  0.0  0.8  -0.8  0.1 
3  -4.4  -0.3  0.0  -0.6  0.2  0.1 
4  -3.1  -0.2  0.0  -2.1  1.1  0.1 
1975:1  -2.2  -0.1  0.0  -1.5  1.0  0.0 
6 percent  growth  in 
money  supply  plus 
markup  to cover  increase 
in  fuel prices 
1973:4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1974:1  1.5  0.1  0.0  -0.8  1.0  0.0 
2  3.8  0.3  0.0  -1.4  1.6  -0.1 
3  9.0  0.7  0.0  -2.5  2.7  -0.2 
4  15.6  1.1  0.1  -3.3  3.6  -0.3 
1975:1  21.2  1.5  0.1  -2.0  3.6  -0.4 
Commercial  paper  rate 
fixed at 7 percent 
1973:4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1974:1  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.3  0.3  0.0 
2  6.4  0.5  0.0  -3.5  4.9  -0.1 
3  13.4  1.0  0.0  -4.5  6.2  -0.3 
4  19.7  1.4  0.0  -2.1  4.2  -0.4 
1975:1  25.0  1.7  0.0  0.4  2.2  -0.5 
quarters,  but  the difference  from  the actual  path  of output  is small.  Interest 
rates  rise  even  faster  than  they  actually  did  during  the first  half of 1974,  but 
are noticeably  lower  than  actual  by year's  end. 
If the growth  in the  money  supply  had departed  from  the 6 percent  path 
merely  to the extent  of accommodating  the expanded  demand  for money 
required  by oil-price  increases  (second  bank,  table 1), the economy  would 
have been noticeably  stronger  during  1974,  although  unemployment  still 
would  have  reached  8 percent  by the first  quarter  of 1975.  The commercial 
paper  rate  would  have  remained  about  2 percentage  points  below  the levels George L. Perry  227 
Table 1 (continued) 
Com- 
Gross  national  mercial  Unem- 
product  Private  paper  ployment 
nonfarm  rate  rate 
Current  1958  business  (per-  Money  (per- 
dollars  dollars  deflator  centage  supply  centage 
Policy and  quarter  (billions) (percent) (percent)  points)  (percent)  points) 
$20 billion  reduction  in 
personal  income  taxes 
1973:4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1974:1  5.6  0.4  0.0  0.3  0.0  -0.1 
2  10.8  0.8  0.1  0.7  0.0  -0.3 
3  13.1  0.8  0.1  1.2  0.0  -0.3 
4  14.4  0.8  0.2  1.6  0.0  -0.4 
1975:1  15.1  0.8  0.2  1.3  0.0  -0.3 
Markup  in growth  of 
money  supply  to cover 
increase  in  fuel prices 
plus tax reduction 
1973:4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1974:1  7.2  0.5  0.0  -0.6  1.0  -0.1 
2  15.1  1.1  0.1  -0.9  1.6  -0.4 
3  23.3  1.6  0.2  -1.6  2.7  -0.6 
4  32.4  2.1  0.3  -2.2  3.6  -0.7 
1975:1  39.8  2.5  0.4  -1.0  3.6  -0.8 
Commercial  paper  rate 
fixed at 7 percent  plus 
tax reduction 
1973:4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
1974:1  6.6  0.5  0.0  -0.3  0.6  -0.1 
2  18.9  1.4  0.1  -3.5  5.5  -0.4 
3  30.9  2.1  0.2  -4.5  7.3  -0.7 
4  42.1  2.8  0.4  -2.1  5.6  -0.9 
1975:1  51.8  3.3  0.5  0.4  4.0  -1.1 
Source: Projections  from public version of the SSRC-MIT-Penn model. 
actually  reached  in the second  and  third  quarters  of 1974,  averaging  9 per- 
cent in the peak  summer  quarter. 
Only  a slightly  stronger  economic  performance  results  from  allowing  the 
commercial  paper  rate to decline  to 7 percent  during  the first  quarter  of 
1974  and  stay  there  (third  bank,  table 1).  The  model  estimates  an extremely 
volatile  path  of money  growth  to accompany  this  policy:  very  rapid  growth 
in the second  quarter  of 1974  and  a substantial  decline  in the last two quar- 228  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
ters  of the projection.  There  are  two things  to note about  this result:  First, 
although  money  growth  would  have departed  from its actual  path in the 
direction  indicated  by the model  projection,  the quantitative  estimates  also 
reflect  the erratic  behavior  of money  demand  during  the year and should 
probably  be modified.  Such  modification  is discussed  below  in connection 
with  table  2. Second,  this  result  exposes  the  inadequacy  of a policy  designed 
to hold short-term  interest  rates  fixed  at a time,  like the end of 1974,  when 
real  product  demand  is falling  sharply.  Although  the constant-interest-rate 
policy  would  have  put real  GNP an estimated  1.7  percent  above  the actual 
level  in the first  quarter  of 1975,  it still  permits  a substantial  rate  of decline 
in real  GNP after  the third  quarter  of 1974. 
TAX  REDUCTION 
In the  model  projections,  the effectiveness  of a $20  billion  cut in personal 
income  taxes  depends  heavily  on the monetary  policy  that accompanies  it. 
The  tax cut alone,  with  the money  supply  constrained  to the levels  actually 
experienced,  adds  $11  billion  to GNP by the  second  quarter  of the  year;  but 
the increment  rises only to $15 billion three quarters  later (fourth  bank, 
table 1). While  consumer  spending  rises  promptly,  the lack of any accom- 
modation  by monetary  policy  drives  interest  rates  up even  faster  than  their 
actual rise, with the commercial  paper rate averaging  13 percent  in the 
third  quarter  of the year.  Investment  demands  are choked  off, sharply  re- 
stricting  the improvement  in total GNP. 
Combining  the tax reduction  with  a monetary  policy  that  accommodates 
the increases  in fuel  prices  on top of the 6 percent  growth  path  gives  a sub- 
stantially  bigger  lift to real output  and employment  (fifth  bank, table 1). 
Interest  rates  do not rise  nearly  as sharply  during  the year  with  this policy 
mix,  peaking  about  1?/2 points  below  the  levels  actually  reached  in the  third 
quarter  of the year and staying  below actual  rates  throughout  the projec- 
tion period.  GNP grows  steadily  relative  to its actual  path every  quarter, 
with a $40 billion  difference  by the first  quarter  of 1975,  or a 2.5 percent 
higher  real GNP. 
The combination  of the tax cut with a monetary  policy that holds the 
commercial  paper  rate  at 7 percent  from the second  quarter  of 1974  on is 
easily  the most supportive  of the policy alternatives  (sixth  bank, table 1). 
GNP is $52 billion  higher  than actual  in 1975:  1, representing  3.3 percent 
more  real  output  and  0.5 percent  higher  prices,  as measured  by the private George L. Perry  229 
nonfarm  business  deflator.  The unemployment  rate is a full point lower 
than  actual  by the start  of 1975  under  this alternative.  The  increment  asso- 
ciated  with this combined  tax-and-interest-rate  policy is greater  than the 
sum of the effects  of a tax cut and fixed interest  rates taken separately. 
The  combined  policy  involves  a slightly  faster  growth  in the money  supply 
throughout;  by the first  quarter  of 1975,  the money supply  is 4.0 percent 
greater  than  actual  and 1.8  percent  greater  than  its level with  the policy  of 
fixing  the commercial  paper  rate  alone. 
ALTERNATIVE  ECONOMIC  PATH 
In table  2, the  results  of the policy  combining  a $20  billion  tax reduction 
and a fixed  rate on commercial  paper  are laid out more fully. The table 
compares  the actual  paths of GNP, its major  spending  components,  and 
other  key  economic  variables,  with  their  estimated  paths  under  the alterna- 
tive policy. The projections  for the alternative  policy embody the same 
errors  experienced  by the model in tracking  the actual  path of GNP over 
the interval  shown.  In fact, had the alternative  policy actually  been pur- 
sued,  some of the surprises  in the economy  that led to these errors  would 
not have been the same, and the model projections  should be amended 
accordingly.  In particular,  inventory  accumulation,  growth  in the money 
supply,  and the unemployment  rate may not be well represented  for the 
alternative  policy because  of the nature  of the surprises  in the economy 
during  1974.  In turn,  modifying  these variables  would alter  the projected 
GNP as well.  In addition  to the amendments  suggested  by model  errors  in 
1974,  the structure  of the model  may not adequately  capture  the extent  to 
which  the downward  momentum  of the economy  in late 1974  would  have 
been avoided  by a stronger  expansion  earlier  in the year. 
Money demand  and interest rates. The model uses the Treasury bill rate 
in the money-demand  equation.  The commercial  paper  rate is estimated 
from  the Treasury  bill rate.  For the first  half of 1974,  the model  predicted 
actual  money  demand  reasonably  well, given the actual  path of Treasury 
bill rates  and GNP. However,  the spread  between  the commercial  paper 
rate  and  the Treasury  bill rate  widened  sharply,  to more  than  4 percentage 
points  in July.  This  gap represented  a substantial  error  in the prediction  of 
commercial  paper  rates  in the model.  Partly  as a result  of this  error,  a huge 
increment  to the  growth  of the  money  supply  is projected  for the alternative 
policy.  In the second  quarter,  the commercial  paper  rate  is 31/2  percentage ^~~~~~~~~0  "-I  tinm  n 
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points  below  its actual  levels,  and  is accompanied  by a bill  rate  an estimated 
4.7 percentage  points  below actual  since  the prediction  error  between  the 
two rates  is maintained.  This difference  in the bill rate, along with a $20 
billion  higher  GNP, in turn  requires  the 23 percent  increment  in the growth 
rate  of money  that  is projected  in the table:  the model  projects  the money 
growth  required  to achieve  a bill rate  averaging  3  1/2  percent  in the second 
quarter. 
In fact,  the errors  in predicting  the commercial  paper  rate from  the bill 
rate may well have resulted  from the dramatic  rise in the federal  funds 
rate  and  the expectation  of rising  rates  that  it engendered.  With  short  rates 
stable, the spread  between bills and other short rates would not have 
widened  as it did and  the swings  in the growth  of the money  supply  would 
have been far smaller  than those projected  for the alternative  forecast  in 
table  2. 
Because  it is the  bill  rate  that  was  out of line  with  other  rates  in the  middle 
quarters  of 1974,  while  it is other  rates  that  most  heavily  affect  real  activity 
in the model, the other characteristics  of the alternative  policy forecast 
would  not change  substantially  with these amendments  to the projected 
path  of money  growth. 
Inventory  accumulation.  Large  prediction  errors  are also present  for in- 
ventory  change  in 1974.  The rate  of accumulation  in the fourth  quarter  of 
the year  is underpredicted  by about $14 billion,  basically  representing  the 
unintended  building  of stocks  in that  quarter.  The  increment  of $8  1/2  billion 
to inventory  accumulation  estimated  for the alternative  policy leads to a 
projected  accumulation  rate of $26 billion. While  the motivations  for in- 
ventory  behavior  are  particularly  difficult  to untangle,  there  is little  reason 
to believe  that a stronger  economy  would  simply  have added $81/2  billion 
of desired  accumulation  on top of the large  amount  of unintended  accumu- 
lation in that quarter.  Predictions  about the volatile  inventory  sector  are 
highly  speculative,  but it seems  more  reasonable  to believe  that accumula- 
tion, and GNP, would  have  been lower  than projected  for the alternative 
policy  in the fourth  quarter  of 1974,  with  the inventory  swing  between  the 
fourth  and  first  quarters  smaller  than  projected  by the  model.  The  recession- 
ary swing  in real GNP would  also be modified  as a result. 
Unemployment  and prices. During 1974, the unemployment  rate re- 
mained  below  predictions  based  on the path  of real output.  Okun  has con- 
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on the  expectation  that  output  would  soon  revive.8  The  SMP  model  reflects 
the unusually  low unemployment  rate  primarily  in large  underpredictions 
of productivity  during  1974.  Again,  the alternative  policy  projection  main- 
tains  these  underpredictions.  But  if Okun's  conjecture  is correct,  employers 
would  have  been  unlikely  to keep  the same  increment  of "excessive"  labor 
with  output  levels  that  were  higher  and  therefore  nearer  their  expectations. 
Thus,  the unemployment  rate  probably  would  not have been lower  in the 
stronger  economy  by nearly  as much  as the  model  predicts.  There  probably 
existed  the potential  for substantially  higher  production  in 1974  without  a 
corresponding  lower  level of unemployment  and greater  degree  of labor 
market  tightness.  This  conjecture  also implies  that  disposable  income,  con- 
sumption,  and GNP would  have  been somewhat  smaller  than projections 
of the alternative  policy  in the model. 
While  this adjustment  to the unemployment  projection  also suggests  a 
smaller  increment  to the price deflator  projected  by the model, the pre- 
dicted  effect  over  a short  period  would  be small  enough  and confidence  in 
the inflation  equations  is shaky  enough  that forecasts  here are especially 
risky.  One cannot rule out the possibility  that, although  unemployment 
rates  would  have  been somewhat  higher  than  projected,  the effect  of lower 
unemployment  on prices  would  have  been greater  than  the model  predicts. 
On the other  hand,  with somewhat  more  confidence,  one can believe  that 
the greatest  part  of the double-digit  inflation  in 1974  was unrelated  to un- 
employment  or other aspects  of utilization  and, furthermore,  would not 
have been passed  forward  into wages to any great degree. On this view, 
absent  a runaway  boom, inflation  would  have  slowed  considerably  in 1975 
in any  case,  even  if not quite  so much  as it has in fact. 
Downward  momentum.  It is my  clear  impression  that  econometric  models 
are generally  too sluggish  in periods  of sharp  cyclical  swings  in the econ- 
omy.  Just  as they  fail to predict  fully the steepness  of a recessionary  slide, 
they  generally  do not "add  back"  enough  GNP when  projecting  the effects 
of policies  designed  to head off the recession.  Strong  accelerator  effects 
operate  to pull the economy  down once it begins  to slip, and even models 
that  give good estimates  of the economy  in most quarters  will fail to cap- 
ture  these  responses.  Part  of this  problem  has  just  been  discussed  in connec- 
tion with inventories  in late 1974. More generally,  a policv mix strong 
8. Arthur M. Okun, "Unemployment  and Output in 1974," BPEA (2:1974), pp. 
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enough  to restore  normal  growth  rates  during  the middle  quarters  of 1974 
might  have  avoided  any  decline  in GNP thereafter,  even  though  the model 
will  not project  that "happy  result"  since  it implies  extraordinary  add-ons 
to GNP in the recession  quarters  and therefore  much  more  GNP response 
per  unit of stimulus  than  in the immediately  preceding  quarters.  Thus,  the 
model  projections  that make  the recession  very  hard  to avoid  may be too 
gloomy.  A policy response  that spurred  prompt  growth  in GNP in 1974 
could well have paid large  dividends  in avoidance  of the sharp  recession 
that  emerged  late in the year. 
Morals  and  Messages 
The adjustments  just discussed  apply,  in different  degrees,  to the other 
model  estimates  presented  in table 1. In particular,  the analysis  of money 
demand  implies  that the policy defined  in terms  of faster  money growth 
would have lowered  the commercial  paper rate more than predicted  in 
table 1 and thus stimulated  the economy  to a greater  degree.  While  such 
adjustments  are worth  noting,  they do not alter  the basic  messages  of this 
exercise  for policy  alternatives  during  1974. 
Increases  in oil prices  pushed  the economy  toward  a predictable  reces- 
sion in 1974,  and neither  fiscal  nor monetary  policy  was adjusted  so as to 
offset  their depressing  impact.  Policies  very different  from those actually 
pursued  were  required  to confine  the downturn  to the first  quarter  of 1974. 
The strongest  policy  considered,  combining  a stable  7 percent  rate  on com- 
mercial  paper  after  the first  quarter  with  a $20 billion  tax cut effective  the 
first  of the year,  would  have  kept  real  GNP crawling  forward  in the second 
and third quarters.  A bigger  push would have been needed  to avoid the 
steep  decline  that followed. 
For what  it is worth,  the 6 percent  track  for money  growth  would  have 
weakened  the economy  even more than the actual experience.  And the 
similarly  stubborn  constant-interest-rate  policy  would  have  been obviously 
perverse  by the end of 1974,  since  it could  contribute  nothing  to heading  off 
the economic  tailspin. 
The  model  plainly  shows  that,  if the  economy  needs  a push,  it pays  to use 
both hands.  The strongest,  combined,  policy lifts output  by considerably 
more  than  the sum of the separate  lifts  from  holding  interest  rates  constant 
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one believed  that  tax cuts  were  somewhat  more  effective  than they are esti- 
mated  to be in the SMP  model. 
For many reasons,  this point is valid even though, in principle,  more 
stimulus  or restraint  from one instrument  can substitute  for less from 
another  for purposes  of stabilizing  aggregate  output.  Policies  differ  in their 
timing,  and  fiscal  measures  can give  the economy  a prompter  lift. Whether 
or not they  ought  to be, policymakers  may be restrained  from using  a sole 
instrument  very  aggressively:  if there  is already  some reluctance  to apply 
the rates  of money  growth  that rapid  expansion  will require  even with  the 
assistance  of tax cuts, one would  have  to expect  still  more  resistance  to the 
greater  money  growth  that would  be required  without  an expansive  fiscal 
policy.  Similarly,  the budget  deficit,  and political  concerns  about  it, would 
have  to be deeper  if fiscal  policy  had to work  alone. More concretely,  the 
uncertainty  about how much stimulus  or restraint  is correct  grows  when 
only one instrument  is used.  This point, originally  analyzed  by Brainard,9 
becomes  especially  relevant  when  the economy  is far  from  its desired  level, 
as it is today, and the required  policy  change  is large. 
A year buffeted  by all the unusual  developments  of 1974  shows prag- 
matism  clearly  dominating  simple  rules.  Although  no search  was made  in 
this paper  for an optimal  policy, if economic  goals had given weight  to 
avoiding  deep recession,  its ingredients  would have included  early fiscal 
stimulus,  avoidance  of the sharp  runup  in interest  rates  during  the  first  half 
of 1974,  and  sharply  lower  interest  rates  once  the weakness  later  in the year 
became  evident. 
Discussion 
A NUMBER of participants  commented  on the performance  of various  sec- 
tors,  offering  their  amendments  to Okun's  interpretations.  James  Tobin  felt 
that  Okun  tended  to overstate  the strength  of plant  and  equipment  expendi- 
tures  in 1974  by focusing  on current-dollar  magnitudes.  In real  terms,  capi- 
tal expenditures  had turned  out to be sharply  lower than businessmen's 
expectations  early  in the year.  R. J. Gordon  suggested  that  the end of price 
9. William  Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy," American  Eco- 
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controls  was an important  contributor  to the high inflation  rate of the 
second  half of 1974  and that  the effect  was predictable  from  the record  of 
price-cost  behavior  during  the controls  period.  Gardner  Ackley  saw links 
among  the unusual  strength  of inventory  accumulation  during  1974,  the 
price  explosion  following  the removal  of controls,  and shortages  or supply 
constraints  in important  basic  materials.  He viewed  much  of the inventory 
building  as speculative-although  more to ensure  supplies  than to profit 
from rising  prices.  Those efforts to accumulate  supplies  kept materials 
scarce  and  prices  high. 
Saul  Hymans  cautioned  Okun  against  heavy  reliance  on the component 
shares  of disposable  personal  income  as an explanation  for  the  performance 
of consumption.  Any  model  that  relied  solely  on concurrent  changes  in dis- 
posable  income  would  be a poor predictor  of consumer  outlays.  A satis- 
factory  model  must  include  additional  variables  and lag structures.  Okun 
agreed  in principle,  but suggested  that,  when  the shares  display  a consistent 
cyclical  pattern,  they can provide a cross-check  on more sophisticated 
equations. 
F. Thomas  Juster  inferred  from  the  performance  of consumption  in 1974 
that saving  behavior  could not be explained  well solely  by income.  In his 
research,  a variable  reflecting  the price  expectations  of consumers,  as re- 
ported  in surveys,  helps  a great  deal  to explain  saving  behavior  from 1970 
on. Consumer  expectations  of prices  lagged  behind  actual  price  movements 
in 1974,  and  unanticipated  inflation  pushed  up the saving  rate.  With  infla- 
tion  now slowing  down,  that  variable  points  to a particularly  strong  recov- 
ery of consumption  in 1976 as the saving  rate drops sharply.  Okun re- 
sponded  that  the 1976  experience  should  be a good test of Juster's  success 
in fitting  the saving  rate  to the acceleration  in the inflation  rate.  He felt  that 
the results  to date were  impressive  but might  be coincidental.  The saving 
rate  jumped  in 1970,  and, except  for 1972,  has remained  high since. Con- 
currently,  the economy  has experienced  rapid  inflation  except  for a signifi- 
cant  deceleration  in 1972. 
Franco  Modigliani  emphasized  the point  made  by both Perry  and  Okun 
that  monetary  policy  early  in 1974  was a major  force  in the economic  con- 
traction  in the  second  half  of the  year,  most  notably  in the housing  collapse. 
Michael  Wachter  doubted  that, in the fall of 1974, monetary  and fiscal 
authorities  could have instituted  the expansionary  policies simulated  by 
Perry  because  of their  uncertain  impacts  on an economy  experiencing  a 5.4 
percent  unemployment  rate  and a 14 percent  inflation  rate  and because  of 
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Perry  had mentioned  the possibility  of threshold  effects  on real activity, 
Wachter  thought  it plausible  that  the  economy  was  at an inflation  threshold 
in the third  quarter.  Although  the highly  restrictive  policies  that were pur- 
sued  are  difficult  to justify,  a big stimulative  push  at that time might con- 
ceivably  have kept the rate of inflation  above 10 percent.  Walter  Salant 
commented  that  errors  were  made  in private  policy  (such  as the pricing  of 
1975  auto  models)  in 1974  as well  as in fiscal  and  monetary  policy,  and that 
they  compounded  the problems  of forecasting  and public policymaking. 
Several  panel  members  elaborated  on Okun's  discussion  of forecasting 
and the 1974  predictions.  Juster  observed  that the ASA-NBER forecasts 
exhibited  consistent  turning-point  errors  throughout  1974; not only the 
survey's  average,  but  also the  most  pessimistic  (that  is, the least inaccurate) 
forecasts  kept  predicting  an imminent  upturn.  He interpreted  recent  fore- 
casting  performance  as indicating  that  the profession  has a long way  to go 
before  it can  predict  for a world  that  is not very  stable;  he urged  forecasters 
to consider  the importance  of expectational  factors  when the economic 
situation  is changing  rapidly.  Tobin suggested  that most models  are con- 
tinually  being  revised  to avoid repeating  past forecasting  errors,  and that 
this  process  may  build  in persistence  and sluggishness  that would  preclude 
accurate  forecasting  of a major  change  in activity,  upward  or downward. 
Much  of the discussion  of the Perry  paper  centered  around  the reason- 
ableness  and  interpretation  of the simulation  results.  John  Shoven  reminded 
Perry  that the econometric  model he had simulated  had not predicted 
a serious  recession;  he wondered  how confident  one could  be in the results 
of its simulations  of policy alternatives.  Joseph Pechman  summarized 
Perry's  results  as suggesting  that the unemployment  rate  would  have  been 
reduced  by only a little over 1 percent  with an expansive  fiscal-monetary 
combination.  Tobin  felt that the model  might  underestimate  the construc- 
tive  impact  of timely  policy  for the same  reasons  that  it underestimated  the 
severity  of the recession.  Hymans  took issue  with Perry's  methodology  in 
analyzing  the  results  of the  model's  simulations.  He argued  that  one cannot 
accept  some variables  as plausible  estimates  while rejecting  others,  since 
they  are  all simultaneously  determined.  Perry  accepted  this point, but felt 
justified  in highlighting  aspects of the simulations  with which he was 
strongly  dissatisfied.  Agreeing  with  Tobin on the problem  of sluggishness, 
he expressed  particular  concern  about  the lack of adequate  accelerators  in 
the  model.  He stressed  that  the simulations  were  more  instructive  in assess- 
ing the relative  impacts  of alternative  policy measures  than in forecasting 
particular  variables. 